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I. INTRODUCTION
In Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III),' the United States Supreme
Court held that law enforcement may not conduct a warrantless search of a
premises shared by co-occupants where a physically present co-occupant
expresses his or her refusal to consent to the search, even if law enforcement
obtains the voluntary consent of another co-occupant of the premises.2 This
article will introduce the historical context of the decision and provide an
overview of the Randolph III opinion. The article also discusses cases that
have addressed the impact of Randolph III on the future of third-party con-
sent in the context of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion. In conclusion, the author will offer his own observations regarding the
opinion.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND-A REFLECTION ON THE PAST
A. The Fourth Amendment Generally Prohibits Warrantless Searches
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that
no person will be subjected to "unreasonable searches and seizures" of their
"persons, houses, papers, and effects." 3 Unlike most constitutional amend-
ments, the Fourth Amendment further includes specific language regarding
its application, stating, "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."4  Consequently, war-
rantless searches by law enforcement are generally deemed per se unreason-
able) With the passage of time, however, courts have carefully loosened the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment by carving out a number of
limited, well-defined exceptions.' Although recognizing that factual circum-
1. 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006).
2. Id. at 1518-19.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Id.
5. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914).
6. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (holding evidence of
crime will not be suppressed where officers discover the evidence during a warrantless entry
of a home in pursuit of a fleeing felon); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (ex-
plaining that police may enter a home without a warrant where an exceptional circumstance
exists); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948) (asserting that evidence will not
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stances, often of a time-sensitive nature, may justify these exceptions, the
United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to infringe upon the protec-
tions of the Fourth Amendment that were so specifically outlined by the
framers of the United States Constitution.7 Thus, the Court has observed,
"[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as
a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent. '"8
B. Valid Consent Is an Exception to the Warrant Requirement of the
Fourth Amendment
Beginning in the early 1900s courts began to realize that a warrantless
search by law enforcement with the voluntary consent of the property owner
could not logically qualify as an "unreasonable" search.9 For example, in
United States v. Williams, " officers obtained the permission of a ranch
owner to "look the premises over.""1  While on the premises, the officers
located what appeared to be evidence of a moonshine operation. 2 In up-
holding the search, the United States District Court for the District of Mon-
tana stated, "[t]his search without warrant, but with [the owner's] consent,
was not unreasonable."13  Armed with this realization, valid consent was
later recognized as one of the limited, well-defined exceptions to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 14 Further development of this prin-
ciple over time would soon reveal that valid consent, as an exception to the
freedom from warrantless searches, would become a useful tool for law en-
forcement and expand to encompass a variety of factual scenarios.
be suppressed based upon warrantless entry where police are confronted with the imminent
possibility that evidence will be destroyed).
7. See Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 315-16 (1921).
8. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 295 F. 219, 220 (D. Mont. 1924); Cass v. State,
61 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. Crim. App. 1933).
10. 295 F. at 220.
11. Id. at 219.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 220.
14. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624, 629 (1946), vacated, 330 U.S. 800 (1947).
2007]
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C. Valid Consent Does Not Require a "Knowing and Intelligent" Waiver
of Fourth Amendment Rights by a Defendant
Given the overwhelming importance of constitutional rights to the
American system of justice, the prosecution bears a heavy burden anytime it
attempts to prove that an accused has waived one of those rights. 5 Specifi-
cally, in most circumstances, the prosecution is required to prove that the
person waiving a constitutional right knew of both the existence of the right
as well as his or her right to refuse to waive the right. 6 Commonly referred
to as a "knowing and intelligent waiver,"' 7 this burden has been applied to a
variety of constitutional rights in criminal cases. ' Therefore, since consent
to a warrantless search, at the most basic level, is nothing more than a waiver
of a person's Fourth Amendment rights, does law enforcement have to in-
form an accused of his or her right to refuse to consent to a search? The
United States Supreme Court answered this question in the negative in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 19
In Schneckloth, evidence was obtained against the defendant during a
consensual search of a vehicle. 20 Although both California appellate courts
affirmed the defendant's conviction, the defendant pursued a writ of habeas
corpus in federal court. 21 Setting aside the district court order denying ha-
beas relief, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
the prosecution was required to prove that the person granting consent knew
he or she had the right to refuse to waive his or her Fourth Amendment
rights. 22 The United States Supreme Court reversed, stating, "[w]hile knowl-
edge of the right to refuse consent is one factor to be taken into account, the
government need not establish such knowledge as the sine qua non of an
effective consent.,
23
The primary significance of Schneckloth was that the Supreme Court
distinguished the protections of the Fourth Amendment from other constitu-
15. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
16. Id.
17. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
18. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 526 (1972) (waiver of the right to a speedy trial);
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966) (waiver of the right to confrontation); Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 191 (1957) (waiver of the right to be free from double jeopardy);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 71 (1942) (waiver of the right to counsel).
19. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
20. Id. at 220.
21. Id. at 221.
22. Id. at 221-22.
23. Id. at 227.
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tional "trial rights," such as the right to counsel, which usually require a
knowing and intelligent waiver.24 However, the practical, common sense
reasoning utilized by the Court in reaching this conclusion demonstrated the
Court's willingness to expand, rather than further restrict, the principles sur-
rounding consent searches except in cases involving coercion or threats. For
example, the Court noted that the burden imposed on the prosecution by the
Ninth Circuit decision would be unworkable in real world application, as the
prosecution would seldom be capable of proving that an unprovoked, con-
senting defendant knew of his/her right to refuse consent.25 In so reasoning,
the Court stated, "[a]ny defendant who was the subject of a search authorized
solely by his consent could effectively frustrate the introduction into evi-
dence of the fruits of that search by simply failing to testify that he in fact
knew he could refuse consent., 26 Additionally, the Court observed that it
would be completely "impractical ' 27 to impose a requirement that law en-
forcement provide a defendant with a detailed warning in consent search
cases. 21 Observing that consent searches often occur under the time pres-
sures of active investigations and in such intimate places as the home, the
Court stated, "[t]hese situations are a far cry from the structured atmosphere
of a trial where, assisted by counsel if he chooses, a defendant is informed of
his trial rights.,
29
D. Valid Consent May Be Effectively Obtained from a Variety of Persons
Other than the Defendant
In the simplest of cases involving consent searches, a property owner
has voluntarily acquiesced directly to law enforcement officers, in their pres-
ence, to a warrantless search and evidence unearthed during the search is
used against the property owner.3 ° In such cases, it should come as no sur-
prise that evidence may be used against the property owner since it is pre-
cisely that property owner who has waived his/her very own Fourth Amend-
ment rights by virtue of his/her very own consent.3 However, the evolution
of legal principles over time is seldom as elementary as the reasoning found
in the simplest of cases, as varying factual nuances consistently challenge the
24. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 237-38 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 458
(1938)).
25. Id. at 230.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 231.
28. Id.
29. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 232 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)).
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complacency of seemingly well-settled doctrines. The development of case
law involving consent searches provides an excellent example of this con-
stant dilemma.
As more cases involving consent searches began reaching appellate
courts, it soon became clear that joint ownership or use of property by multi-
ple persons would present unique questions regarding the effectiveness of
consent by one person to the detriment of others.32 Specifically, courts were
faced with the question of whether, via consent, an individual may waive the
Fourth Amendment rights of another individual, based upon the fact that the
individuals jointly share use and control of the property at issue.33 For ex-
ample, in Stein v. United States,34 a wife discovered that her husband pos-
sessed and used opium in their home.35 The couple later separated with the
husband moving to his mother's home and the wife eventually moving into a
friend's home.36 The wife later returned to the marital home with federal
narcotics agents and permitted the agents to search the home.37 The agents
discovered drug-related evidence that was used against the husband in a
prosecution for drug crimes.38 In rejecting the husband's argument that the
search was not permitted by the Fourth Amendment, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the wife could unilaterally permit warrantless entry by
law enforcement without the consent of her husband.39 The court relied
heavily upon the fact that the husband and wife both had an equal right to
possess the home, stating that "[t]he right of [the wife] to enter the house
cannot be seriously questioned."4
As case law continued to evolve, the authority of persons having equal
rights of possession and control of property to authorize a warrantless search
to the detriment of other co-occupants or co-owners was further extended to
encompass an assortment of factual scenarios." Some courts seemed to fo-
32. See, e.g., Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1930) (addressing
whether a wife's consent was binding on her husband where police coerced her consent).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 464 (4th Cir. 1962).
34. 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1948).
35. Id. at 852.
36. Id. at 853.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Stein, 166 F.2d at 855.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253, 260-63 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding
that consent of a joint user of an automobile is effective against other users); United States v.
Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463, 465 (4th Cir. 1962) (holding that consent of a person who borrows an
automobile temporarily, while the automobile is in that person's possession, is effective
against the actual owner); see Teasley v. United States, 292 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1961)
(holding that joint occupant of an apartment may consent to a warrantless search to the detri-
[Vol. 31
6
Nova Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2007], Art. 11
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol31/iss3/11
RANDOLPH V. GEORGIA
cus their reasoning on the fact that the person authorizing the warrantless
search possessed the same right to authorize entry by law enforcement as the
person against whom the evidence was being used.42 However, in 1969, the
United States Supreme Court articulated an additional justification for per-
mitting warrantless third-party consent searches, which focused on the ac-
tions of the person against whom evidence is being used in assuming the risk
that other persons may consent to warrantless searches by police.4 3
In Frazier v. Cupp,44 the defendant jointly used a duffel bag with his
cousin. 45 The cousin permitted a warrantless search of the bag by law en-
forcement and evidence was discovered linking the defendant to a murder.46
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall, the United
States Supreme Court "dismissed rather quickly, ' 47 the defendant's conten-
tion that the search was not authorized by finding that the defendant, as the
person against whom the evidence was being used, maintained the duffel bag
jointly with his cousin and left the bag in his cousin's home. 48  Conse-
quently, the Court stated that the defendant, "must be taken to have assumed
the risk that [his cousin] would allow someone else to look inside., 49 The
Court's discussion in Frazier regarding third-party consent consumed ap-
proximately one page of the published opinion of the Court and was by no
means an exhaustive analysis. 50 However, in 1974, the Court would take the
liberty to create a more well-defined standard in third-party consent cases in
United States v. Matlock.5
In Matlock, the defendant was arrested in the yard of a residence he oc-
cupied with other persons for the crime of bank robbery.52 The arresting
officers were aware that the defendant lived in the residence, however, the
officers did not request consent from the defendant to search the residence.53
Instead, the officers approached an individual named Gayle Graff at the door
ment of other co-occupants); United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 74 (7th Cir. 1954) (finding
evidence acquired during a warrantless search of a printing plant operation admissible where
business partner of the defendant consented to the warrantless search by police).
42. See Eldridge, 302 F.2d at 467-68; Sferas, 210 F.2d at 74-75.
43. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
44. Id. at 731.
45. Id. at 740.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740.
49. Id.
50. See generally id.
51. 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
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of the residence who ultimately permitted the officers to come inside. 4
Once inside, Ms. Graff consented to a warrantless search of the home, in-
cluding a bedroom that she shared jointly with the defendant." The officers
obtained evidence against the defendant during the search that was used by
the prosecution. 6 The Court held that valid consent may be obtained from
someone other than the defendant, "who possessed common authority over
or other sufficient relationship to the premises. 517 Although the Court re-
manded the case for further findings consistent with the opinion,58 the Court
specifically defined "common authority"59 as not being represented by the
person's interest in the premises searched in the context of property law but
instead, the Court stated that such authority:
rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally
having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is rea-
sonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to
permit inspection in his own right and that the others have as-
sumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common
area to be searched.60
As a result, the Court defined "common authority" to consent based
upon two factors: first, based upon the inherent right of the co-occupant
granting the consent to do so; and second, the actions or inactions of the de-
fendant against whom evidence is being used in "assuming the risk" that
his/her co-occupant will grant consent.6'
The Matlock decision represents the first time that the United States Su-
preme Court established significant, guiding principles regarding when one
person's consent is valid to the detriment of another. Although questions
would soon arise regarding the scope of one's consent under MailoCk,62 the
opinion reached landmark status as its holding began to be recognized and
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166-67.
57. Id. at 171.
58. Id. at 178.
59. Id. at 171 n.7.
60. Id.
61. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Orejuela-Guevara, 659 F. Supp. 882, 885-89 (E.D.N.Y.
1987) (noting that consent may not be valid where the third-party granting consent does not
possess a sufficiently close relationship to the property searched).
[Vol. 31
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applied throughout the federal system. 63 However, the Matlock decision
specifically reserved the question of whether a warrantless search is permis-
sible when officers reasonably believe that they are obtaining consent from
an individual with "common authority" over the premises but, in fact, the
person does not have such authority.' The Court would not address this
issue until approximately sixteen years later in Illinois v. Rodriguez.65
In Rodriguez, police in Chicago were called to the home of an individ-
ual named Dorothy Jackson.66 Upon arrival, the officers met Ms. Jackson's
daughter, Gail Fischer, who appeared to be the victim of a physical attack.67
Fischer informed the officers that Rodriguez had beaten her up earlier in the
day at his apartment, which was also located in Chicago, but on a different
street. 6' Fischer then traveled with the officers to the apartment in order to
arrest Rodriguez; however, the officers did not obtain a search warrant or an
arrest warrant.69 Upon arrival, Fischer entered the apartment using a key and
permitted the officers to come inside. 70
Unknown to the officers at the time, Fischer had taken the key without
Rodriguez's permission, and had moved out of the apartment with her chil-
dren approximately one month prior to the incident.7 Fischer's name was
not on the lease for the apartment, she paid none of the rent for the apart-
ment, and she was not permitted to have guests in the apartment without
Rodriguez's permission.72 However, Fischer referred to the apartment as
"our[s] ' , 73 while conversing with the officers, and indicated that she had
clothing and furniture inside the apartment.74
Once inside, the officers discovered evidence of drug-related activity in
the living room and bedroom where Rodriguez was actually present and
sleeping during the search. 75 Rodriguez was arrested on drug related charges
and subsequently moved to suppress the evidence found inside his apart-
63. See United States v. Sullivan, 544 F. Supp. 701, 714 (D. Me. 1982) (providing a
thorough list of federal cases recognizing and applying Matlock between 1974 and 1982
throughout the country).
64. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
65. 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
66. Id. at 179.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 180.
70. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
71. Id. at 181.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 179.
74. Id.
75. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
2007]
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ment.76 Finding that Fischer was nothing more than an 'infrequent visi-
tor"' 7 incapable of granting consent to search the apartment, the trial court
granted Rodriguez's motion. 8 The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed,79
concluding that the officers' belief, no matter how reasonable, that consent
was valid is of no consequence to a Fourth Amendment analysis.8" The State
of Illinois's petition for review by the Supreme Court of Illinois was denied
and the case ended up before the United States Supreme Court.8'
The Court began its opinion by expressly stating that the State of Illi-
nois had not met its burden of showing that Fischer possessed "common au-
thority" over the apartment necessary to authorize her to grant consent to the
detriment of Rodriguez since she was no longer a joint occupant.82
Nevertheless, the Court held that valid consent may be obtained from a
third-party where officers reasonably, though erroneously, believed that the
consenting third party possesses common authority over the premises.83 In
spite of the fact that Fischer was not a joint occupant of the apartment, the
Court reasoned that all that is required in justifying a warrantless search
based upon third-party consent is that the police officers make reasonable
conclusions from the facts.84 In determining if police conduct is reasonable,
the Court observed that the Fourth Amendment does not require that an offi-
cer's assessment always be factually accurate, but only that the officer's as-





80. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188-89.
81. Id. at 180-81.
82. Id. at 181 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)).
83. Id. at 186-88.
84. Id. at 186.
85. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
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E. Prior to Randolph, Valid Consent Could Be Effectively Obtained from
Persons Other than the Defendant, Even If the Defendant Was Present
at the Time of the Warrantless Search and Objected to the Search
Once legally identified as an exception to the Fourth Amendment war-
rant requirement,86 valid consent would expand to permit third parties having
actual authority,17 as well as apparent authority, 88 over property to pennit
law enforcement to conduct a warrantless search to the detriment of a crimi-
nal defendant. However, if such a third party consents to a warrantless
search but the defendant, having equal authority over the property and pre-
sent at the time of the search, objects to the search, may the police proceed
without a warrant? 89 Approximately thirty-two years after Matlock, and six-
teen years after Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court would answer
this question decisively in the negative. 9 Prior to Randolph III, however,
every federal circuit to address this question consistently reached the oppo-
site result with little debate. 9'
In allowing warrantless searches under these circumstances, federal
courts relied almost exclusively on the standard set forth in Matlock.92 Some
federal courts addressed the issue fairly briefly with very little substantive
analysis. 93 Utilizing a more extensive analysis, however, other courts ex-
panded the application of the Matlock standard to provide that a person with
common authority over property may permit a warrantless search by law
enforcement even if the defendant has equal authority over the property, is
present at the time of the search, and specifically objects to the search. 94 In
so reasoning, some courts concluded that when a defendant assumes the risk
86. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624, 630 (1946).
87. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171.
88. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186-88.
89. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520
(2006).
90. Id. at 1520-21.
91. See United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1995); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548 (11th Cir.
1995); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1 st Cir. 1992); United States v. Baldwin, 644
F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1977).
92. See Rith, 164 F.3d at 1328; Morning, 64 F.3d at 534-36; Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1548;
Donlin, 982 F.2d at 33; Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 687-88.
93. See Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1548; Donlin, 982 F.2d at 33; Baldwin, 644 F.2d at 383.
94. See Rith, 164 F.3d at 1328; Morning, 64 F.3d at 534-36; Lenz, 51 F.3d at 1548;
Donlin, 982 F.2d at 33; Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88.
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that others will consent to a warrantless search by cohabiting with other peo-
ple, he or she essentially waives his or her expectation of privacy to a limited
extent.95 By way of example, in United States v. Rith,96 the Tenth Circuit
held that a son, who lived in his parent's home, could not revoke the previ-
ously obtained consent of his parents to a warrantless search, even though the
revocation was made contemporaneous to the search.97 The court stated,
Under Matlock and its interpretive progeny, [the son] had no ex-
pectation of privacy that negated his parents' consent to a search of
their home. To hold otherwise would undermine the gravamen of
Matlock: "any of the co-habitants has the right to permit the in-
spection in his own right and ... the others have assumed the risk
that one of their number might permit the common area to be
searched. 98
The majority of state appellate courts addressing this issue concurred
with the federal courts' conclusion.99 However, a small minority of state
appellate courts, including the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
reached a contrary result.l"° Of the courts subscribing to this view, the Su-
preme Court of Washington provided the most thorough analysis. 101 In State
v. Leach, 10 2 the defendant's girlfriend consented to the search of an office
that she and the defendant possessed equal control over.0 3 The defendant
was present at the time of the search but the record in Leach did not indicate
that he actually objected to the search. "4 The court held that the girlfriend's
95. Rith, 164 F.3d at 1328; Morning, 64 F.3d at 536; Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 688.
96. 164 F.3dat 1323.
97. Id. at 1328.
98. Id. (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974)); see also Morn-
ing, 64 F.3d at 536 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7) (stating that "[a] defendant cannot
expect sole exclusionary authority unless he lives alone"); Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 688 (stating
with regard to a joint occupants ability to object to a warrantless search consented to by a co-
occupant that "[tihere is no reasonable expectation of privacy to be protected under such cir-
cumstances").
99. See, e.g., Love v. State, 138 S.W.3d 676, 681 (Ark. 2003); People v. Sanders, 904
P.2d 1311, 1315 (Colo. 1995); City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203-05 (Wyo.
1991); People v. Cosme, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 1321-23 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Ramold, 511
N.W.2d 789, 792 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994); Brandon v. State, 778 P.2d 221, 223-24 (Alaska Ct.
App. 1989); State v. Frame, 609 P.2d 830, 832 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
100. See, e.g., Shingles v. State, 872 So. 2d 434, 437-39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004);
State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035, 1038-40 (Wash. 1989).
101. See Leach, 782 P.2d at 1038-40.
102. Id. at 1085.
103. Id. at 1036.
104. Id. at 1036-37.
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consent did not justify a warrantless search.'1 5 The court distinguished
Matlock, stating that the Matlock standard only applied to "absent, noncon-
senting" defendants. 06 Since the defendant in Leach was present at the time
of the search, the court found the warrantless entry by police to be unlawful
in spite of the girlfriend's consent. 107
III. RANDOLPH V. GEORGIA-THE PRESENT STATE OF THE LAW
In late May 2001, "Scott Randolph and his wife, Janet [Randolph],
separated."'0 8 Prior to this separation, the coupled resided in a home located
in Americus, Georgia that they rented from Scott Randolph's father, Edward
Randolph.' 09 Both Mr. and Mrs. Randolph considered the home to be their
marital residence. "0 However, when the couple separated, Mrs. Randolph
traveled to Canada to stay with her parents, taking the couple's child and
some belongings with her. "' Mr. Randolph remained at the home in Ameri-
cus, Georgia. 112 For reasons unknown, Mrs. Randolph returned to the home
in Americus, Georgia in early July 2001. "'
At approximately 9:00 a.m. on July 6, 2001,'14 Mrs. Randolph re-
quested that local police come to the home regarding a domestic dispute with
Mr. Randolph. "5  Upon arrival, Mrs. Randolph complained that Mr.
Randolph had taken the couple's child to a neighbor's home following their
dispute." 6 Not long after the police arrived, Mr. Randolph returned to the
home stating that he had taken the child to a neighbor's home fearing that
Mrs. Randolph may attempt to flee to Canada with the child again." 7 Accu-
sations of misconduct soon erupted from both Mr. Randolph and Mrs.
105. See id. at 1040.
106. Leach, 782 P.2d at 1038 (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170
(1974)).
107. Id. at 1040.
108. Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph I1), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519 (2006).
109. Id. at 1519; see also Brief for Petitioner at 3, Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III),
547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006) (No. 04-1067); Respondent's Response to Petition for
Certiorari at 3-4, Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph II), 604 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. Nov. 8, 2004) (No.
A03A0906).
110. Respondent's Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 109, at 2.
111. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
112. Randolph v. State (Randolph 1), 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
113. Randolph I, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
114. Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
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Randolph. ' Mrs. Randolph accused Mr. Randolph of using substantial
quantities of cocaine, thus resulting in financial problems for the couple." '9
Mr. Randolph denied the allegations and, in retaliation, alleged that it was
Mrs. Randolph who abused both drugs and alcohol. 20 In fact, at subsequent
hearings in the case, Mr. Randolph would accuse Mrs. Randolph and an un-
known male companion of consuming as many as thirty-six bottles of beer in
the twenty-four hour period prior to the incident with police.' 2' He described
her as being unsteady on her feet, smelling of alcohol, and experiencing di-
lated pupils at the time of the encounter with police. 122 Although police de-
nied witnessing Mrs. Randolph in a state of intoxication or incapacity, the
police acknowledged that there was hostility and animosity between the cou-
ple at the time. 1
23
One of the officers, Sergeant Brett Murray,1 24 traveled with Mrs.
Randolph to the neighbor's home in order to retrieve the child. 125 Upon re-
turning to the home, Mrs. Randolph continued to complain about Mr.
Randolph's drug abuse and further stated that there was evidence of his drug-
related activities inside the home. 26 Sergeant Murray asked Mr. Randolph
about his drug abuse'27 and requested his consent to search the home. ' 28 Mr.
Randolph, an attorney, "unequivocally refused" to grant consent. 129 Sergeant
Murray then requested the consent of Mrs. Randolph which she "readily
gave."' 130 Mrs. Randolph then proceeded to take the officer inside the home
to the couple's upstairs bedroom.' Inside the bedroom, Sergeant Murray
discovered what appeared to be a straw with cocaine residue on it, consistent
with an instrument used to ingest cocaine. 1
32
118. Id.; Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
119. Randolph ll, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519; Randolph 1, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
120. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
121. Respondent's Response to Petition for Certiorari, supra note 109, at 3-4.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 109, at 4.
124. Brett Murray is now a Major with the Sumter County Sheriff's Department in Ameri-
cus, Georgia. Major Brett Murray, Sumter County Sherrifs Office, http://www.sumter-
ga.com/sheriff/index.html (last visited June 4, 2007).
125. Randolph 11, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
126. Id.
127. Id.; Randolph v. State (Randolph 1), 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
128. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
129. Id.
130. Id.; Randolph 1, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
131. Randolph I1, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
132. Id.; Randolph 1, 590 S.E.2d at 836.
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Sergeant Murray left the home in order to obtain an evidence bag so
that he could properly collect and store the evidence. 33 He also contacted
the local district attorney's office and was instructed to stop the search and
obtain a warrant. "34 As Sergeant Murray approached the home in order to
retrieve the straw, Mrs. Randolph withdrew her consent to the search.
35
Sergeant Murray then took the straw, as well as the Randolphs, to the local
police station and obtained a search warrant for the home. 136 A subsequent
search of the home pursuant to the warrant revealed numerous drug-related
items. 137
Mr. Randolph was subsequently indicted for possession of cocaine.' 31
Mr. Randolph moved to suppress the evidence, contending that the search
violated his Fourth Amendment rights. "3' The trial court denied the motion,
but the Court of Appeals of Georgia granted Mr. Randolph's application for
interlocutory appeal. 14
0
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the trial court.'41 In particu-
lar, the court favored a bright-line rule that police must always obtain a war-
rant before conducting a warrantless search where officers received compet-
ing responses to a request for consent to search from co-occupants having
equal authority over the property at issue. '42 The court reasoned that it is
"inherently reasonable" in the context of the Fourth Amendment for police to
always honor and respect the refusal of a co-occupant to grant consent. 143 In
so reasoning, the court observed that if "common authority" is the basis for
one co-occupant's right to consent, then "common authority" is likewise a
basis for another co-occupant's right to refuse to consent.'" Consequently,
the court stated, "[i]nherent in the power to grant consent is the power to
vitiate that consent."' 145 Regarding cases involving a marital residence, the
court further noted that such a holding would also protect the sanctity of mar-
riage by not permitting a wife to overrule the objection of her husband. 146





138. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
139. Id.
140. Id; Randolph v. State (Randolph 1), 590 S.E.2d 834, 836 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
141. Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 840.
142. Id. at 836-37.
143. Id. at 837.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 837.
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Rejecting a case-by-case analysis, the majority also concluded that a
bright-line rule would provide more defined guidance to law enforcement
when faced with similar circumstances to those presented in Randolph by
simply instructing officers to obtain a warrant.14 Additionally, responding
to the dissent, the majority distinguished Matlock based upon the fact that,
unlike the defendant in Matlock, Mr. Randolph was present at the time of the
search and unequivocally refused consent. 4  More specifically, the court
stated,
Matlock and its progeny stand for the proposition that, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that a co-
occupant has waived his right of privacy as to other co-occupants.
However, when police are confronted with an unequivocal asser-
tion of that co-occupant's Fourth Amendment right, such presump-
tion cannot stand. 1
49
Judge Ellington and Judge Phipps each wrote their own concurring
opinions. 50 Judge Ellington simply reiterated his belief that the conclusion
of the majority effectively protected the privacy rights of citizens while si-
multaneously providing clear guidelines for law enforcement.' 5 ' Judge
Phipps, however, wrote his own special concurrence in order to express his
disagreement with the bright-line approach used by the majority in a number
of respects.' 52 Relying upon Matlock and its progeny, Judge Phipps advo-
cated a more case-by-case, fact intensive approach based upon a reasonable-
ness standard.'53 Judge Phipps ultimately agreed with the conclusion of the
majority, however, because Sergeant Murray was faced with "bickering
spouses" and possessed "no hard evidence" of a crime and, accordingly, did
not act reasonably in conducting a warrantless search based upon Ms.
Randolph's consent alone. 5 4 Under those circumstances, Judge Phipps con-
cluded that the officers should have obtained a warrant.' 55 Arguing that his
approach would provide "reasonably clear guidance" to law enforcement,
Judge Phips stated:
147. Id. at 838.
148. Id.; see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
149. Randolph I, 590 S.E.2d at 838.
150. Id. at 840-43.
151. Id. at 840 (Ellington, J., concurring).
152. Id. (Phipps, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 840-43.
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If there is some objective verification that a crime has been com-
mitted, the police may search the common areas of a residence
with the consent of one occupant or spouse even if another co-
occupant or spouse objects. If one co-occupant or spouse simply
summons the police to a residence and accuses his or her co-
occupant or spouse of illegal conduct, the matter should be submit-
ted to a neutral and detached magistrate if another co-occupant or
spouse is present on the premises and objects. As always, in cases
of doubt and in the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrant
should be obtained. 1
56
Judge Blackburn joined Judge Andrews in a dissenting opinion.'57 Ar-
guing that the majority misconstrued and misapplied the Fourth Amend-
ment's reasonableness standard, Judge Blackburn focused almost exclusively
on Matlock and its progeny. With regard to the specific facts of Randolph,
Judge Blackburn concluded:
Because the defendant shared dominion over the property with his
wife at the time consent was given by her, the waiver of his expec-
tation of privacy with regard to the premises remained in effect.
With his expectation of privacy still waived with regard to his
wife, the defendant had no right to trump her consent to search
their home. 1
58
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted the State of Georgia's petition
for writ of certiorari.'59 However, in a remarkably brief opinion, the court
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.' 60 The court began
by recognizing that a co-occupant who possesses common authority over
property may consent on behalf of all others, as set forth in Matlock. 16' The
court further acknowledged the reasoning of Matlock, which states that a co-
occupant possesses "his own right" to consent and other co-occupants have
"assumed the risk" that he or she will exercise that right in their absence. 162
Nonetheless, the court distinguished Matlock based solely on the fact that
Mr. Randolph, unlike the defendant in Matlock, was present at the time of
the search and objected to it.163 Regarding the assumption of risk language
156. Id.
157. Id. at 843-52.
158. Id. at 845.
159. State v. Randolph (Randolph I), 604 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 2004).
160. Id. at 837.
161. Id. at 836-37 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974)).
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in Matlock, the court stated that "the risk 'is merely an inability to control
access to the premises [in] one's absence."' "'  Consequently, the court chose
to follow the lead of the Supreme Court of Washington in Leach and invali-
dated the search of Mr. Randolph's home. 
165
Three justices joined in a dissenting opinion.166 The dissent began by
pointing out that the weight of existing authority disfavored the majority's
conclusion.167 The dissent, also relying upon Matlock, concluded that Mr.
Randolph "assumed the risk" his wife would grant consent in her "own
right" and, therefore, Mr. Randolph could not subsequently invalidate his
wife's consent by way of his objection. 161
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 169 In the end, how-
ever, the Court adopted the same bright-line approach as the Georgia appel-
late courts below. 7° Specifically, the Court held, "a warrantless search of a
shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physi-
cally present resident cannot be justified as reasonable as to him on the basis
of consent given to police by another resident." 171
The Court began its analysis by briefly exploring the history of third-
party consent cases, beginning with the adoption of valid consent as an ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, and concluding with
the holding in Rodriguez. 172  The Court noted the standard set forth in
Matlock, to the extent that a co-occupant with common authority over prop-
erty, may permit a warrantless search to the detriment of other absent co-
occupants. 173 Nevertheless, the Court observed that none of the prior third-
party consent cases from the United States Supreme Court dealt with the
issue of whether police may rely on the consent of one co-occupant in con-
ducting a warrantless search in the face of an expressed refusal to allow the
search by another, present co-occupant. 174 Thus, the Court concluded that
164. Randolph II, 604 S.E.2d at 837 (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZuRE: A
TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT § 8.3(d) (3d ed. 1996)).
165. Id. (referring to State v. Leach, 782 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Wash. 1989)).
166. Id. at 837.
167. Id. at 837-38 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 838.
169. Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1520 (2006).
170. See id. at 1527-28.
171. Id. at 1526.
172. Id. at 1518-19, 1527-28 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990);
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 222 (1973); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958)).
173. Id. at 1519 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170-71).
174. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
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"[t]he significance of such a refusal turns on the underpinnings of the co-
occupant consent rule, as recognized since Matlock."175
The Court then provided insight into the meaning and significance of
the "common authority" necessary under Matlock to justify a warrantless
search. 176 The Court pointed out that "great significance [is] given to widely
shared social expectations" based, in part, on property law in determining the
reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment search.177 As such, the Court stated
that the objective reasonableness of a search under Matlock, "is in significant
part a function of commonly held understanding[s] about the authority that
co-inhabitants may exercise in ways that affect each other's interests." 78
After citing a number of cases in which no "common authority" could
justify a warrantless search based on third-party consent, 179 the Court turned
to the question of whether one co-occupant's consent to a search may over-
ride an objection to the search by another, physically present co-occupant. 180
In this regard, the Court observed by way of example that "no sensible per-
son" would enter a home where one co-occupant invites him/her inside, and
another co-occupant expressly refuses.' 8' The Court explained that such a
result is necessary because no socially recognized understanding, or legally
recognized doctrine of property law, exists as to the superior or inferior au-
thority of one co-occupant over the other in these circumstances.' 82 Accord-
ingly, the Court decided that "there is no common understanding that one co-
tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of
another, whether the issue is the color of the curtains or invitations to outsid-
ers."' 183 Armed with this conclusion, the Court further reasoned that a "police
officer [has] no better claim to reasonableness" in conducting a warrantless
search under these circumstances, as one occupant's consent bears no greater
weight than another occupant's objection.'84
The Court next turned its attention to the potential impact that its deci-
sion may have on future investigations stating, "[y]es we recognize the con-
175. Id. at 1520.
176. Id. at 1521-22 (citing Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170).
177. Id. at 1521.
178. Id.
179. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1522 (citing Minnesota v. Olsen, 495
U.S. 91, 99 (1990); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964); Chapman v. United States,
365 U.S. 610, 617 (1961); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)).
180. Id. at 1522.
181. Id. at 1522-23.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1523.
184. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1523.
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senting tenant's interest as a citizen in bringing criminal activity to light."' 185
Recognizing the competing interests of bringing new crimes to light, and, at
the same time, protecting the Fourth Amendment rights of the citizens, the
Court suggested a couple of ways that both interests may be preserved in
future cases. 186 Specifically, the Court explained that nothing in its decision
prevents future co-occupants from delivering evidence of crime directly to
law enforcement without a warrantless search,'87 and law enforcement may
still rely upon information obtained from the consenting co-occupant to ob-
tain a search warrant from a magistrate, regardless of whether another co-
occupant objects. 188 Responding directly to Chief Justice Roberts's dissent,
the majority also asserted that the decision would have "no bearing on the
capacity of the police to protect domestic victims ' ' 189 as police are still per-
mitted to enter a home without a warrant any time there is good reason to
believe that a threat of domestic violence exists.' 90 The Court, however, did
acknowledge that, in close cases, the rule it adopted may prevent police from
conducting a search for evidence where no exigency or other legally recog-
nized exception authorizes warrantless entry.' 9' Nevertheless, the Court de-
cided that such a risk was ultimately justified in order to adequately secure
the Fourth Amendment rights of the citizens. 1
92
At the conclusion of the majority opinion, the Court attempted to ad-
dress what it viewed as "two loose ends" created by its ruling. 193 First, the
Court addressed the language of Matlock, which states that a co-occupant of
shared property mutually used by multiple occupants possesses "his own
right" to consent to a search, and thus, reliance on the co-occupant's consent
by law enforcement is reasonable. '94 With regard to this loose end, the Court
observed that even though the co-occupant may possess "his own right" to
authorize warrantless police entry, the right is not so superior or powerful
that it may override the competing and equal right of the other co-occupants
to refuse to consent. "' The second loose end the Court sought to clarify was
the impact the decision would have on the standards set forth in Rodriguez
185. Id. at 1524 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488 (1971)).
186. Id. 1524-25.
187. Id.
188. Id. (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965)).
189. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1525.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1525-26.
192. See id. at 1526.
193. Id. at 1527.
194. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1527 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415
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and Matlock. '96 As noted by the Court, those cases rested upon similar facts
as to those at issue in Randolph 111.197 The defendants in those cases, like
Mr. Randolph, were physically nearby or actually present at the time of the
searches at issue. 198 In particular, the defendant in Matlock was in a police
car at the time of the search, and the defendant in Rodriguez was asleep in a
bedroom at the time of the search.' 99 Highlighting the formalistic character
of its decision, the Court stated:
If [Matlock and Rodriguez] are not to be undercut by today's hold-
ing, we have to admit that we are drawing a fine line; if a potential
defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and
objects, the co-tenant's permission does not suffice for a reason-
able search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited
to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.200
Accordingly, Randolph III imposes no obligation on law enforcement to
proactively seek the approval of any absent, or even nearby, co-occupant
prior to conducting a warrantless search based upon the consent of a present
co-occupant.20'
Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer both wrote their own concurring
opinions.202 Justice Stevens argued that the Randolph III decision validates
his view that the Court cannot focus solely upon the original understanding
of constitutional amendments and ignore the "relevance of changes in our
society. 2 3 Justice Stevens pointed out that when the Fourth Amendment
was adopted, a husband would have superior authority over premises than
that of his wife; thus, his consent would be the only relevant inquiry.2 4
Therefore, Justice Stevens noted that if the Court followed an original under-
standing of the Fourth Amendment, an arbitrary, if not blatantly discrimina-
tory, result may prevail.205 According to Justice Stevens, however, the pre-
sent society recognizes that both husband and wife have equal constitutional
rights regarding property, and "[a]ssuming that both spouses are competent,
196. Id. at 1527.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Randolph l11, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1527.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1527.
202. Id. at 1528-29 (Stevens, J., concurring), 1529-31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 1528 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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neither one is a master possessing the power to override the other's constitu-
tional rights to deny entry to their castle. 20 6
Justice Breyer, on the other hand, wrote his own separate, concurring
opinion in order to express his agreement with the majority's conclusion and
articulate his own reasoning on how that conclusion should be reached.2"7
Justice Breyer advocated a more fact-specific approach, based upon the total-
ity of circumstances that, rather than imposing bright-line rules, focuses upon
the reasonableness of the officer's actions in conducting a warrantless
search. 20 ' Finding Sergeant Murray's search for evidence in the face of Mr.
Randolph's present objection to be unreasonable, Justice Breyer stated that
were the circumstances to change significantly, so should the result.20 9 Hint-
ing as to how he may decide future cases, Justice Breyer noted that evidence
of exigency, or an invitation to police by a potential abuse victim, may pro-
vide a "special reason" for an immediate entry by police, unlike the circum-
stances in Randolph III.
210
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, wrote a dissenting opin-
ion.21" ' Chief Justice Roberts began his opinion by summarizing his dis-
agreement with the majority and stating his own opinion regarding what rule
should have been applied.21 2 Specifically, Chief Justice Roberts complained
that the majority's approach was too "random and happenstance" to ade-
23quately protect privacy. ' 3 Alternatively, Chief Justice Roberts argued the
Court should have held that any time a person shares a place with another, he
or she assumes the risk that person will permit law enforcement to enter,
even if he or she objects.214
Chief Justice Roberts then attacked the majority's reliance on under-
standings regarding "social expectations" in formulating its holding.2" 5
Chief Justice Roberts observed that concepts of what constitutes socially
acceptable conduct on the part of persons who share living arrangements
jointly does not provide a solid foundation on which to rest constitutional,
Fourth Amendment standards.2t 6 In direct contradiction to the majority's
observations regarding social expectations, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1529-31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
208. Id.
209. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1530.
210. Id. at 1530.
211. Id. at 1531-39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
212. Id. at 1531.
213. Id.
214. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1531 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1531-32.
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that different factual situations within a social setting may give rise to differ-
ent social expectations.1 7 Through examples, Chief Justice Roberts noted
that the relationship among the parties, the reason for the visit, or perhaps
even the distance a visitor has traveled, may lead a visitor to enter a home at
the invitation of one co-occupant, even over the objection of another co-
occupant. 218 Chief Justice Roberts further observed that with the exception
of determining when a Fourth Amendment search has occurred, and when a
person has standing to raise a Fourth Amendment challenge, the Court has
not looked to concepts of social expectations in determining when a search is
reasonable in previous cases. 1 Instead, Chief Justice Roberts explained that
the Court's Fourth Amendment precedents focus more on the protection of
privacy than the impact on social expectations by looking to whether a per-
son has a legitimate expectation of privacy in gauging the reasonableness of
a search.220 As such, Chief Justice Roberts asserted:
A wide variety of often subtle social conventions may shape ex-
pectations about how we act when another shares with us what is
otherwise private, and those conventions go by of a variety of la-
bels-courtesy, good manners, custom, protocol, even honor
among thieves. The Constitution, however, protects not these but
privacy, and once privacy has been shared, the shared information,
documents, or places remain private only at the discretion of the
confidant. 221
To support this assertion, Chief Justice Roberts highlighted a number of
cases in which an individual was found to have waived his or her expectation
222of privacy in such things as oral conversations, personal property,223 and
private information. 24  Chief Justice Roberts observed further that the
Matlock 25 and Rodriguez2 6 decisions are consistent with this line of cases as
both decisions share the "common thread" found in all third-party consent
cases that one who shares control over property with others, assumes the risk
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1531-32 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
220. Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
221. Id. at 1533 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
222. Id. (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971)).
223. Id. (quoting Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969)).
224. Randolph I, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1533-34 (quoting United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984)).
225. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1974).
226. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 189 (1990).
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that his or her co-occupants may consent to a warrantless search.227 Conse-
quently, Chief Justice Roberts stated:
The law acknowledges that although we might not expect our
friends and family to admit the government into common areas,
sharing space entails risk. A person assumes the risk that his co-
occupants-just as they might report his illegal activity or deliver
his contraband to the government-might consent to a search of
areas over which they have access and control. 228
Chief Justice Roberts then shifted his focus to the practical conse-
quences of the Randolph III decision. 229 First, Chief Justice Roberts stated
that the opinion is "so random in its application" that it cannot effectively
protect one's privacy.230 In particular, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the
opinion will afford no protection of a person's privacy right "if a co-owner
happens to be absent when police arrive, in the backyard gardening, asleep in
the next room, or listening to music through earphones so that only his co-
occupant hears the knock on the door.",231 Next, Chief Justice Roberts
pointed out that by not allowing police to search based on a co-occupant's
consent, simply because another co-occupant is present and objects, may
lead to retaliation against the consenting co-occupant by the objecting co-
occupant, or even destruction of evidence once the police leave the home.232
Moreover, with reference to domestic abuse case, Chief Justice Roberts ex-
plained that the exigency necessary to justify a warrantless search may not
always exist in every case.233 Additionally, Chief Justice Roberts determined
that the newly announced "'consent plus a good reason"' rule in domestic
abuse cases "spins out an entirely new framework for analyzing exigent cir-
cumstances. 234 Therefore, the rule seems contrary to the majority's appar-
ent disdain for a co-occupant's consent since such consent is a key factor in
determining whether police have a "'good reason' to enter the home.235
Summarizing his perceived inconsistency in the majority opinion, Chief
Justice Roberts stated:
227. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1534-35 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).




232. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1537.
233. Id.
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The majority reminds us, in high tones, that a man's home is his
castle, but even under the majority's rule, it is not his castle if he
happens to be absent, asleep in the keep, or otherwise engaged
when the constable arrives at the gate. Then it is his co-owner's
castle. And, of course, it is not his castle if he wants to consent to
entry, but his co-owner objects.236
As a result, Chief Justice Roberts concluded:
Rather than constitutionalize such an arbitrary rule, we should ac-
knowledge that a decision to share a private place, like a decision
to share a secret or a confidential document, necessarily entails the
risk that those with whom we share in turn chose to share-for
their own protection or other reasons-with the police.
237
An originalist no doubt, Justice Scalia apparently felt called out by Jus-
tice Stevens' concurrence and, thus, issued his own dissenting opinion.238
First, Justice Scalia explained that the fact that the Fourth Amendment, as
part of an "unchanging [c]onstitution," often cross-references to the ever-
changing area of property law presents no major hurdle in the path of an
originalist. 23 9 Additionally, Justice Scalia "express[ed] grave doubt that to-
day's decision deserves Justice Stevens' celebration as part of the forward
march of women's equality," given the possible negative impact the decision
may have on law enforcement efforts to investigate domestic violence
against women by men. 240
Justice Thomas issued his own dissenting opinion in which he con-
cluded that Coolidge v. New Hampshire211 squarely controlled the outcome
in Randolph 111.242 In Coolidge, while investigating a murder, police asked
the wife whether her husband owned any guns. 243 Thinking her cooperation
would exonerate her husband, the wife obtained a number of her husband's
guns from the couple's bedroom and gave them to police.244 The Court later
rejected the husband's Fourth Amendment challenge on the grounds his wife
236. Id. at 1539 (citations omitted).
237. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1539.
238. Id at 1539-1541 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
239. See id. at 1540.
240. Id. at 1540.
241. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
242. Randolph Il, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1541-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 486-90).
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searched his home as an "instrument" of law enforcement.245 The Court rea-
soned that the wife was not converted to a government agent simply by vir-
tue of the fact that she made her own decision to cooperate with police.2 4
6
Therefore, based on Coolidge, Justice Thomas concluded that no Fourth
Amendment search occurred in Randolph III since Ms. Randolph acted on
her own accord in directing police to the drug-related area and was not acting
as an agent of the government.247
IV. SUBSEQUENT CASES-A GLIMPSE OF THE FUTURE
A. An Expressed Objection of a Co-occupant to a Warrantless Search May
Override the Voluntary Consent of Another Co-occupant Even if the
Objecting Co-occupant Is Not Physically Present at the Time of the
Search.
The first Florida court to address significant issues related to Randolph
I1 was the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.248
In United States v. Dominguez-Ramirez,249 agents with the Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency intercepted a shipment of furniture
crossing the Mexican border in El Paso, Texas that contained marijuana and
was ultimately destined for Ocala, Florida.250  Law enforcement officers
from various local and federal agencies across the country decided to con-
duct a controlled delivery of the narcotics to the address in Ocala, Florida in
an attempt to further the investigation.25' The narcotics were delivered to a
Florida address where the defendant, his brother, and one other individual
were arrested.25 2 During a subsequent, late-night interview of the defendant,
law enforcement officers asked for the defendant's consent to search his
residence, located on a different street in Ocala, Florida.253 The defendant
authorized the officers to search his home "in the morning" and not that night
245. Id. at 487.
246. Id. at 487-88.
247. See Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1541-43 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 488-98).
248. See United States v. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-cr-6-Oc-1OGRJ, slip op. (M.D.
Fla. June 8, 2006).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 2.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 3-4.
253. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-cr-6-Oc-1OGRJ, slip op. at 4.
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because his wife was apparently taking insulin for a medical condition, and
consequently, he "did not want her disturbed" that evening.254
Law enforcement also interviewed the defendant's brother, who lived in
a room inside the defendant's home. 255 The brother consented to a search of
his room inside the home and was transported to the residence.256 The de-
fendant's wife came to the door of the residence and the officers informed
her of her husband's arrest and her brother-in-law's consent to search his
room.25 7 The defendant's wife permitted the officers to come into the home
and the officers began searching the defendant's brother's room.2 1 The offi-
cers ultimately obtained consent from the defendant's wife to search the en-
tire home. 259
In denying the defendant's motion to suppress, the court made two ob-
servations. 26' First, the court noted that the defendant never actually refused
to grant consent.26' Instead, the defendant gave a qualification that the offi-
cers could only search the home "[in] the morning. ' 262 In this regard, the
court stated, "[t]hus, in this case there was never a refusal to search by the
co-owner husband sufficient to raise the issue of whether both tenants must
consent before a search is conducted of jointly owned property.' '263 Next, the
court distinguished Randolph II based upon the fact that the defendant was
not physically present at the time of the search.2' Noting that the holding in
Randolph III was limited to its facts and that Randolph III did not overrule
the holding in Matlock, the court found this distinguishing characteristic sig-
nificant enough that the consent of the wife justified the warrantless
search.265 In particular, the court stated, "[t]he Randolph [I] Court, how-
ever, left intact the rule that the consent of only one co-tenant is sufficient so
long as the objector is not present and the police have not removed the ob-





257. Id. at 5.
258. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-cr-6-Oc-1OGRJ, slip op. at 5.
259. Id. at 3.
260. Id. at 17.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Dominguez-Ramirez, No. 5:06-cr-6-Oc-1OGRJ, slip op. at 17.
264. Id.
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The holding in Dominguez-Ramirez seems to indicate that some courts
may adopt a narrow, limited view of the holding in Randolph 111.267 Under
this view, even where police receive an objection from a co-occupant to a
warrantless search, subsequent consent to the search by a different co-
occupant may still justify the warrantless search so long as the objecting co-
occupant is not physically present at the time of the search and there is no
evidence that the officers purposefully removed the defendant from the loca-
tion in order to stifle any objection.2 61 Indeed, given the United States Su-
preme Court's own acknowledgement that its holding in Randolph III draws
a "fine line, 269 such an application may seem legally sound. 70 However,
this approach is at odds with the result reached by the only federal circuit
court of appeals to address substantial questions relating to the Randolph III
decision as of the date of this writing. 7'
In United States v. Hudspeth,272 law enforcement offices in Missouri
obtained a search warrant for a business, Handi-Rak Service, Inc., in relation
to sales of large quantities of pseudoephedrine-based products. 273  The de-
fendant was the Chief Executive Officer of the company and was present
during the search.274 As part of the search, officers discovered a compact
disc containing child pornography.275 The officers requested the defendant's
permission to search his personal residence, which he refused.2 76 The offi-
cers took the defendant to jail and then traveled to the defendant's residence
where they were greeted by the defendant's wife. 277 The defendant's wife
permitted the officers to enter the residence. 27" The officers explained that
they had found inappropriate material on her husband's business computer,
but did not inform her that he had already refused consent to search the cou-
267. See id.
268. See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph III), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519-
20 (2006).
269. Id. at 1527.
270. See United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75 RM, slip op. at 4, 9 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3,
2006) (reaching the same conclusion as the court in Dominguez-Ramirez on similar facts and
determining that applying the Randolph III standard to objecting co-occupants that are not
physically present at the time of the search would require the court to redraw the "fine line"
established by the United States Supreme Court).
271. See generally United States v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006).
272. Id. at 922.
273. Id. at 924.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 925.
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pie's private residence. 279 The wife informed the officers that the couple had
two computers, one in their children's room and one in the garage of their
home; however, the wife refused to grant consent to conduct a search of the
residence.28 ° One of the officers then requested that the officers be allowed
to take the computers and some computer CDs with them.28 The wife ulti-
mately acquiesced.282 A subsequent search of the computer revealed nude
videos of the defendant's step-daughter that were taken without her knowl-
edge by a web camera.283 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence
found on both the business computer and the home computer, which the dis-
trict court denied.284 The defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea,
reserving the right to appeal the suppression issue to the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals.285 The Eighth Circuit upheld the search of the business com-
puter, but reversed the decision with regard to the search of the home com-
puter. 286 The court did, however, remand the case back to the trial court so
that the parties could further develop the record regarding other secondary
grounds for admission of the evidence, such as inevitable discovery. 
287
In its opinion, the court observed the distinguishing characteristics of
both Matlock and Randolph.288 With regard to Matlock, the court noted that
the case at bar did not involve a situation where the defendant was present
but either did not object or was not invited to object. 289 Additionally, in rela-
tion to Randolph, the court pointed out, "Georgia v. Randolph does not di-
rectly address the situation present in this case, in which a co-tenant is not
physically present at the search but expressly denied consent to search prior
to the police seeking permission from the consenting co-tenant who is pre-
sent on the property., 290 Nevertheless, the court found Randolph to be the
controlling case.29' In particular, the court stated that constitutional concerns
identified in Randolph did not change simply because the objecting co-
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 925.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 926.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 932.
287. Id. at 931.
288. Id. at 930-32.
289. Id. at930-31.
290. Id. at 930.
291. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 930-31.
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occupant, who expressly objected to the search, was not physically present at
the time of the search.292
The court then attempted to address the concerns outlined in both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Randolph regarding the fear of retribu-
tion against a domestic abuse victim, who offers warrantless entry to law
enforcement over the objection of his or her co-inhabitant.2 93 The court ob-
served that since the objecting co-inhabitant is not actually present at the
time of police entry in situations such as those presented in Hudspeth, these
concerns would appear moot. 294 Specifically, the court noted, "to some de-
gree, the case for respecting the denial of consent by a non-present occupant
is stronger than the refusal of the physically-present occupant."
295
Circuit Judge Riley wrote a partial dissenting opinion in which he
reached a similar conclusion to that of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida in Dominguez-Ramirez.296 Accusing the majority
of misreading Randolph III, Judge Riley pointed out that the Court in
Randolph III adopted a very narrow and specific rule that only applies when
the objecting co-occupant is physically present.297 Thus, Judge Riley stated,
If the [United States] Supreme Court desired to adopt the broader
rule espoused by the majority here, the Court would not have con-
tinuously used the phrase "physically present," and would have
ruled [that] police entry without a warrant is unreasonable when-
ever the suspect refuses consent to search his residence, regardless
of where the suspect may be located at the time of his express re-
fusal.298
Judge Riley also observed that the majority opinion created policy is-
sues in real world application. 21 In short, Judge Riley characterized the ma-
jority opinion as promoting a "don't ask" and "ignorance is bliss" policy by
law enforcement, °° stating that, "the majority's holding encourages law en-
forcement, in seeking consent, to bypass the suspect lest the suspect refuse
[to] consent, and instead seek only the consent of an authorized co-occupant,
thereby avoiding the knowledge bar.",3 1
292. Id.
293. Id. at 931.
294. Id.
295. Id
296. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 933 (Riley, J., dissenting).
297. See id. at 932-33.
298. Id. at 933.
299. See id.
300. Id.
301. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d at 933-34 (Riley, J., dissenting).
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B. The Objection of a Non-probationer, Co-occupant May Override the
Prior Consent of His or Her Probationer Co-occupant Even if the Pro-
bationer Co-occupant Has Consented to Searches of His or Her Prem-
ises as a Condition of Probation
In the criminal justice system it is common for a defendant to be sen-
tenced to a period of probation instead of incarceration.3"2 Upon being sen-
tenced to probation, the probationer often accepts a waiver of his or her
Fourth Amendment rights as a term of probation, whereby the probationer
consents to a warrantless search of his or her premises by certain law en-
forcement officers.3 °3 So what happens when the probationer shares com-
mon authority over premises with a non-probationer co-occupant and that co-
occupant expressly objects to a warrantless search in spite of the proba-
tioner's limited waiver of his or her Fourth Amendment rights? Can a war-
rantless search continue in the face of such an expressed objection and, if so,
can evidence of culpable conduct be used against the non-probationer? As of
the date of this writing, these questions remain largely unresolved, especially
at the federal level.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York,
however, came close to addressing this issue in July of 2006. 3" In Taylor v.
Brontoli,a°5 officers attempted to search the home of a probationer pursuant
to the terms of the probationer's waiver of her Fourth Amendment rights.
30 6
The probationer's boyfriend, who was not on probation but shared common
authority over the premises, expressly objected to the search.30 7 The officers
searched the premises anyway and uncovered a firearm. 3 08 The boyfriend
was arrested in relation to the firearm. 30 9 He subsequently filed a lawsuit
against the officers pursuant to title 42, section 1983 of the United States
Code claiming that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the war-
rantless search to which he expressly objected.310 On summary judgment the
officers argued, inter alia, that the probationer's girlfriend had previously
consented to the search through the terms of her probation.31' Denying all
302. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.01 (2006).
303. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 383 So. 2d 991, 992 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
304. See Taylor v. Brontoli, No. 1:04-CV-0487, slip op. at 1 (N.D.N.Y. July 12, 2006).
305. Id. at 1.
306. Id. at 4.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 5.
309. Taylor, No. 1:04-CV-0487, slip op. at 5.
310. Id. at 1, 6.
311. Id. at 9.
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motions for summary judgment by all parties with leave to resubmit, the
court invited the parties to address the impact of the recent decision in
Randolph on the facts of the case. 3 2 The court appropriately observed that,
"[f]or the purposes of this case, the issue becomes whether a non-probationer
can refuse consent to a search of a home where he may have a legitimate
expectation of privacy, which is subject to searches by another occupant's
probationary status. 313
At least one state appellate court has held that a non-probationer co-
occupant may refuse consent to a warrantless search even if he/she resides
with a probationer that has previously consented to warrantless searches as a
condition of probation.3"4 A review of state cases at the time of this writing
reveals no other state or federal cases addressing this issue. Consequently,
the impact of the Randolph decision on cases involving facts similar to those
presented in Taylor remains an open question.
V. CONCLUSION-Two OBSERVATIONS
A. The Court in Randolph Seemed to Abandon the "Good Faith" Excep-
tion Established in Illinois v. Rodriguez
At the time of the search in Rodriquez, the officers did not factually have
any legal basis whatsoever to conduct a warrantless search of the defendant's
apartment. 3 ' The officers were not in pursuit of a felon,316 there was no
imminent threat of an emergency31 7 or destruction of evidence,3"8 and the
officers did not possess valid consent to conduct a warrantless search.3 19 In
fact, the individual who permitted the search had no actual authority to per-
mit entry by the police, or anyone else, since she was nothing more than an
"infrequent visitor, ' 32° who allowed the police to enter the apartment using a
key that had been apparently stolen from Rodriguez.3 2' Therefore, using the
strictest application of the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the stan-
312. Id.
313. Id. at 8.
314. See Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315, 321 (Del. 2006).
315. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 182 (1990).
316. Compare id., with Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967).
317. Compare Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 182, with United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52
(1951).
318. Compare Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 182, with Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14-15 (1948).
319. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 181.
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dard set forth in Matlock322 was clearly breached and Rodriguez's rights
were unquestionably violated. Nonetheless, the Court in Rodriguez seemed
to establish a good faith exception to the warrant requirement in third-party
consent cases.323 Specifically, the Court determined that even where the
police are wholly incorrect as a factual matter in concluding that they have
been given valid consent to search by an authorized third party, fruits of the
warrantless search will not be suppressed if the officer's conclusion was ob-
jectively reasonable.324
The Court in Randolph concluded that Sergeant Murray did not have the
authority to conduct a warrantless search of the Randolphs' home based upon
the consent of Mrs. Randolph.3 25  As in Rodriguez, the prosecution in
Randolph III ultimately failed to establish that Sergeant Murray had a legally
sound justification for conducting a warrantless search under the Matlock
standard. 326 However, applying the exception set forth in Rodriguez, 327 it
would seem that the relevant question was not whether Mrs. Randolph's con-
sent gave Sergeant Murray authority to conduct a warrantless search as
purely a matter of fact but instead, the question is, "would the facts available
to [Sergeant Murray] at the moment... 'warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that [Ms. Randolph] had authority over the premises?"3 2
Much like the officers in Rodriguez,329 the facts presented led Sergeant
Murray to conclude that he had permission to conduct a warrantless search of
the Randolphs' home from a person with both actual and apparent authority
over the premises. 30 Mrs. Randolph readily gave Sergeant Murray permis-
sion to search her marital residence.33' As a spouse having equal rights to
the home, it was plausible for Sergeant Murray to conclude that Mrs.
Randolph possessed her own right to permit Sergeant Murray, or anyone
else, to enter the home, in spite of Mr. Randolph's objection to the search. 332
322. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
323. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188, cf United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921-22 (1984)
(holding that where officers, in good faith, reasonably rely on a warrant signed by a magis-
trate that lacks probable cause, fruits of the search will not be suppressed).
324. Id.
325. Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph 11), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1519 (2006).
326. See id. at 1519-21; Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 181; see also Matlock, 415 U.S. at 170,
171 n.7.
327. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
328. Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)) (internal quotations omitted).
329. See id. at 179-80.
330. Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
331. Id.
332. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). But see Randolph III,
547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1529-31 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that Sergeant Murray's
decision to search was unreasonable).
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This is especially true in light of the fact that Mrs. Randolph voluntarily led
Sergeant Murray through the intimate areas of the home and into an area
where drug-related material was discovered. 13 Moreover, at the time of the
search, the overwhelming weight of federal and state authority legally sup-
ported Sergeant Murray's decision to conduct the search, even in the face of
Mr. Randolph's present objection."' Thus, as with the officers in Rodriguez,
at the very moment of the search, Sergeant Murray's conduct was entirely
reasonable under an objective standard.
As specifically noted in Rodriguez, the Court has historically applied a
good-faith, objective standard to police conduct in the context of Fourth
Amendment searches, even where officer's conduct was based solely upon
inaccurate conclusions.335 In short, prior to Randolph, the Court seemed
consistently reluctant to engage in after-the-fact, Monday morning quarter-
backing of decisions by police, made during the intensity of criminal investi-
gations, to conduct a warrantless search so long as there was no evidence of
coercion and the officer's conclusions were objectively reasonable. How-
ever, Randolph seems to alter, if not in part overrule, the holding of Rodri-
guez by applying a bright-line, all-inclusive approach that does not acknowl-
edge the reasonableness of the officer's conduct.
B. Justice Breyer Is the Member of the Court Most Likely to Change His
Position in Future Cases
Although Justice Breyer concurred with the decision of the majority in
Randolph, his core reasoning was quite different.33 ' The majority created a
bright-line, all-inclusive approach that will be applied in all future cases re-
333. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1519.
334. See generally United States v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir. 1999); United
States. v. Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1995); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1548
(11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Donlin, 982 F.2d 31, 33 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v.
Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885
(D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir. 1977); Love v.
State, 138 S.W.3d 676, 680 (Ark. 2003); People v. Sanders, 904 P.2d 1311, 1314-15 (Colo.
1995); City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203-05 (Wyo. 1991); People v. Cosme, 397
N.E.2d 1319, 1321-23 (N.Y. 1979); State v. Ramold, 511 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Neb. Ct. App.
1994); Brandon v. State, 778 P.2d 221, 223-24 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989); State v. Frame, 609
P.2d 830, 832 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
335. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1990) (citing Maryland v. Garrison, 480
U.S. 79, 88 (1987)) (stating that evidence obtained in a search of an apartment should not be
suppressed where officers reasonably decided to search what is later determined to be two
separate apartments pursuant to an erroneous search warrant).
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gardless of the facts at issue.337 Justice Breyer, however, advocated a more
case-specific, fact-intensive approach which focuses primarily upon whether
the circumstances of the case demonstrate that law enforcement officers
acted reasonably in conducting a warrantless, consent search.338 Conse-
quently, in future cases involving consent searches, Justice Breyer is the
most likely member of the Court to permit the specific facts of the case to
dictate the ultimate outcome, and possibly shift the voting ratio of the Court
in favor of a more crime control oriented, pro-law enforcement result.
A review of the oral arguments in Randolph reveals that Justice Breyer
feared that a bright-line approach to the question of reasonableness might
have horrific results in future warrantless search cases with different facts
than those presented in Randolph.339 Justice Breyer raised few questions
throughout oral arguments until attorney Thomas C. Goldstein began his
argument on behalf of Scott Randolph.340 Mr. Goldstein advocated a narrow,
bright-line approach that all warrantless searches of a home are per se unrea-
sonable whenever law enforcement receives an expressed objection to their
search from a person having common authority over the premises.3 1' Justice
Breyer interrupted Mr. Goldstein's argument at one point stating, "[t]he two
words that come into my mind are 'spousal abuse.' 34 2 Justice Breyer then
explained that he was troubled by the prospect that in ambiguous cases,
where no exigency exists, a bright-line approach may result in law enforce-
ment officers not being able to effectively investigate spousal abuse.343 Spe-
cifically, Justice Breyer provided an example wherein police receive an
anonymous tip from a person that heard something "odd" at a neighbor's
home and, as a result, proceed to the home.3" When the police arrive, the
wife, who is sitting at the kitchen table, looks "oddly" at the officer and tells
the officer that she would like him to follow her upstairs to her bedroom.345
The husband is present and objects to the officer entering the home.3 46 Un-
der the circumstances of the example, Justice Breyer expressed grave con-
cem that police would not be able to enter the home in order to hear what the
wife wanted to tell the police in her bedroom that she was too afraid to say in
337. See id.
338. See id.
339. Transcript of Oral Argument at 37-40, Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph II1), 547 U.S.
103, 126 S. Ct. 1515 (2006) (No. 04-1067).
340. See generally id. at 1-30.
341. Id. at 31.
342. Id. at 37.
343. Id.
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front of her husband.347 Indeed, Justice Breyer stated to Mr. Goldstein,
"[a]nd I [a]m telling you, quite frankly, that's what bothers me a lot., 348
In spite of what seemed to be an aversion to Mr. Randolph's position
during oral arguments, Justice Breyer ultimately agreed with the conclusion
of the majority.3 49 Justice Breyer, however, made it very clear that he did not
support a bright-line approach to the issue in Randolph, by stating in the first
sentence of his concurring opinion, "[i]f Fourth Amendment law forced us to
choose between two bright-line rules, (1) a rule that always found one ten-
ant's consent sufficient to justify a search without a warrant and (2) a rule
that never did, I believe we should choose the first. 350  Instead, Justice
Breyer favored a more fact specific approach that focuses on the totality of
the circumstances to determine whether the officers acted reasonably in con-
ducting a warrantless search.3 5' Justice Breyer noted that the spirit of the
Fourth Amendment recognizes that the circumstances of cases involving
warrantless searches can be very different and, consequently, where certain
facts may justify a warrantless search as being reasonable, others may not.352
Thus, Justice Breyer focused on four factual circumstances of the case in
Randolph III that supported his conclusion that Sergeant Brett Murray did
not act reasonably in conducting a search of the Randolph's home, specifi-
cally that: 1) the search was only a search for evidence; 2) Randolph was
present and expressly objected to the search; 3) there was no inference from
the facts that destruction of evidence was a concern of the officers; and 4) the
officers could have easily obtained a warrant prior to conducting the
search.353 As during oral arguments, Justice Breyer also made it clear in his
written concurring opinion that he was very concerned about domestic abuse
cases and that he would be inclined to rule a different way if future facts
demonstrate that a possible abuse victim were inviting the police into a
home.354 In fact, Justice Breyer stated, "[i]n that context, an invitation (or
consent) would provide a special reason for immediate, rather than later,
police entry. 355
347. Id. at 39.
348. Id.
349. Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph 111), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1530 (2006)
(Breyer, J., concurring).




354. Randolph 111, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1529-31 (Breyer, J., concurring); see Tran-
script of Oral Argument at 37-40, supra note 339.
355. Randolph I1, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1530-31 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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A close reading of the dissent written by Chief Justice Roberts may lead
one to speculate that Justice Breyer may have been initially inclined to sup-
port the conclusion of the dissenters or, perhaps, he was at the very least on
the fence prior to the opinion being finalized.356 Since Justice Alito took no
part in the decision, only eight members of the Court voted in the case. 357 In
addressing the perceived unsoundness of Justice Breyer's concurring opin-
ion, Chief Justice Roberts states that Justice Breyer, "joins what becomes the
majority opinion," which seems to indicate that Justice Breyer was the tie
breaking vote in one respect or another.358 Nonetheless, the majority opinion
of the Court certainly seems to reverse the trend of expanding the scope of
consent in third-party consent cases.359 However, it would seem that Justice
Breyer has left the door open for the government to possibly persuade him to
side with the government in future cases.
One can further speculate, with reasonable certainty, that Justice Breyer
will not strike down a warrantless search where there is solid evidence of
possible spousal abuse. 6  His questioning during oral arguments and his
statements in the written, concurring opinion reveal that Justice Breyer is
certainly opposed to placing overly restrictive barriers in the path of law en-
forcement efforts to thoroughly investigate such cases.3 62 This is even more
likely where the potential victim indicates a desire to seek the aid of law en-
forcement.363 However, Justice Breyer's willingness to review the facts of
the case, instead of applying a bright-line approach, indicates that he may be
persuaded to side with law enforcement in other, non-domestic abuse cases
as well.3' 6 For example, where officers are greeted by five residents of an
apartment who consent to a search for evidence, and one resident objects,
perhaps the totality of the circumstances would make a warrantless search
reasonable. 365 Or, as a further example, where police are searching a home
for a possible kidnapping victim as opposed to a mere search for evidence, it
seems likely that the officers' conduct might be viewed as reasonable by
Justice Breyer. 
3 66
356. See id. at 1531-39 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
357. See id. at 1528 (majority opinion).
358. Id. at 1539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
359. See generally id. at 1518-28 (majority opinion).
360. See Randolph III, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. at 1529-30 (Breyer, J., concurring).
361. See id.
362. See generally id.; Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 339, at 36-39, 49-50.
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In addition, Justice Breyer has not been reluctant in past Fourth
Amendment search cases to make decisions, crime control oriented or other-
wise, based upon specific factual nuances of a case. This is especially true
when addressing issues of reasonableness on the part of law enforcement in
the context of Fourth Amendment searches of homes. By way of example, in
Minnesota v. Carter,367 an officer observed narcotics-related activity occur-
ring inside of a basement-level apartment by looking through a window of
the apartment covered by venetian blinds.3 68 The officer was positioned ap-
proximately one to one and a half feet from the window in a publicly acces-
sible area outside of the apartment and observed the activity through a space
in the blinds.3 69 Relying upon this information, the officer obtained a search
warrant for the home and a subsequent search revealed evidence of narcotics
trafficking.370
The majority opinion of the Court never reached the issue of whether
the officer's conduct constituted an unreasonable search.37' Instead, the ma-
jority concluded that the petitioner in the case lacked standing to bring a con-
stitutional challenge.372 However, as in Randolph, Justice Breyer wrote a
separate concurring opinion in which he agreed with the ultimate outcome of
the case, but for different reasons.373 While Justice Breyer concluded that the
petitioner did have standing to challenge the unlawful search,374 he further
observed that the actions of the officer in viewing the criminal activity from
a publicly accessible area outside of the home in plain view of all passersby
was not an unreasonable search. 375 Focusing on the facts of the case, Justice
Breyer specifically stated, "[o]ne who lives in a basement apartment that
fronts a publicly traveled street, or similar space, ordinarily understands the
need for care lest a member of the public simply direct his gaze down-
ward.
, 376
On the other hand, a little more than one year later, Justice Breyer
joined a rather unusual majority of Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
Ginsburg in holding that conduct by police that was arguably similar to the
conduct at issue in Carter constituted an unreasonable search under the
367. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
368. Id. at 85, 103.
369. Id. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
370. Id. at 85 (majority opinion).
371. See id. at 87-91.
372. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 91.
373. See id. at 103-06 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Georgia v. Randolph (Randolph
II1), 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1529-30 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
374. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 103.
375. Id. at 104.
376. Id. at 105.
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Fourth Amendment. 377 In Kyllo v. United States, 378 officers utilized a ther-
mal imaging device from a public street to scan the exterior of a home in
order to detect infrared radiation coming from the home as a result of high
intensity heat lamps used to grow marijuana believed to be inside the
home. 17  The scan revealed an unusual amount of radiation coming from
certain areas of the home and, relying on this and other information, officers
obtained a search warrant.38 ° The majority reasoned that, by using this
equipment, the officers were privy to more than what the naked eye could
see from observing the exterior of the home from the street.3 8' Engaging in a
fact-intensive analysis, the majority concluded, "[w]here, as here, the Gov-
emnment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intru-
sion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without
a warrant.
' 382
377. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29, 40 (2001).
378. Id. at 27.
379. Id. at 29-30.
380. Id. at 30.
381. Id. at 33.
382. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
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